



Panel Review in Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreementt
In September 1988 the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
received the approval of Congress, and implementing legislation subsequently
was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan.' Canada approved the FTA on
December 30, 1988, and the Agreement entered into force on January 1, 1989.
Over a ten-year period, the FTA would eliminate most barriers to trade between
the two countries. Among the significant dispute settlement provisions, 2 the FTA
establishes binding binational panel review to resolve disputes concerning final
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I. Canada-U.S.: Free Trade Agreement. Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) Ihereinafter Free
Trade Agreementi: United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988. Pub.
L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) [hereinafter Implementation Act]. For a history of
Canadian-U.S. trade relations, see Battram, Canada-United States Trade Negotiations: Continental
Accord or a Continent Apart, 22 INT'L LAw.- 345, 347-49 (1988); for a discussion of Canada's
objectives and a Canadian perspective as to potential U.S. gain from the agreement, see Legault, The
Free Trade Negotiations: Canadian and U.S. Perspective. 12 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 7 (1987). See also
Terry, Sovereignty. Subsidies. and Countervailing Diuties in the Context of the Canada-United States
Trading Relationship, 46 U. lOR01o4o FAc. L. Rrv. 48 (1988) McLachlan, Apuzzo & Kerr, The
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 22 J. WoRi o TRAD. 9 (1988).
For a discussion of constraints on Canadian parliamentary action with respect to the FrA, see Koh.
The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, 12 YAle: J. INT't. L. 192, 220-21 (1987).
2. These include a U.S.-Canadian Commission for consultation, nonbinding binational panel
review procedures and emergency review lor grievous error. Some of those are traditional
conciliation, arbitral and medialion procedures; others are purely consultative. See Sohn. infra note
5, for early recommendations for dispute resolution under a proposed free trade agreement.
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antidumping3 and countervailing duty4 orders from the administrative agencies
of either country. The binding procedure will expire in seven years, during which
time the internal laws of both countries will be harmonized to eliminate further
need for the dispute resolution mechanism.
The "unique dispute resolution mechanism, ' 5 while critical to Canada's
acceptance of the FTA to ensure impartiality, stirs controversy in the United
States. In addition to criticism of the binational panel provisions on political and
economic grounds (reflecting concealed protectionism and internal tensions
between the Executive, the Congress, and the courts), the Congress considered
and rejected speculation that these provisions may be constitutionally infirm. 6
Though congressional approval has quelled the policy controversy, hidden in the
constitutional question is distrust over a perceived protectionist bias of the
International Trade Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
their present judicial review function. Some of the fears of the Canadians and
United States free traders are well-known in the subsidy and dumping cases, 7 and
judicial review of agency orders in the United States has gone both ways.
Nonetheless, for as much disinterestedness and impartiality in reviewing orders
as possible under the FTA. including as much insulation as possible from
unilateral statutory changes, the Canadians insisted and the United States
negotiators agreed to Party election to have binding review of these orders in a
binational forum outside domestic judicial control.
3. Free Trade Agreement. supra note I. art. 1904, 27 I.L.M. 281. An antidumping law
responds to dumping. i.e. the introduction of items, generally by a private importer, into a country
of importation at a price less than the value of a comparable item in the country of origin. For a
proposed modification of antidumping duty laws in light of the FTA, see Behm. A Proposed
Modilicotion of U.S. Import Relief Measures in the Context of a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement:
Safeguard, Countervail and Antidunping. 17 GA. J. IN'r'L & Coip. L. 99, 114-18 (1987).
4. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1. art. 1904. A countervailing duty is levied by a country
of importation upon an imported item to offset an unfair export or production subsidy granted by the
government of the country of origin. For a proposed modification of countervailing duty laws in light
of the FTA, see Behm. supra note 3, at 107-113.
5. The Canadian characterization in the Canadian Government's summary explanation. DEer.
OF EXT-RNAL AFFAIRS (CANADA) TilE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT/TRADE: SECURING CANADA'S
FUTURE 268 (1987): see also Sohn. Dispute Resolution Under a North .4tnerican Free Trade
Agreement. 12 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 319 (1987): Alternative Dispute Resolution in Canada-United
States Trade Relations, 40 M-. L. Rtv. 223 (1988).
6. See Customs and Int'l Trade Bar Ass'n, Statement in Opposition to Withdrawal of
Jurisdiction in the United States Court of International Trade and Its Appellate Tribunals to Review
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions of Federal Agencies Involving Canadian Merchan-
dise. Adopted by the Board of Directors, Customs and International Trade Bar Association, (Dec. 3.
1987) [hereinafter CITBA Statement] (which raises constitutionality questions). But see Hearings on
the Camiadla-Uniited States Free Trade Agreement Before the Siibcomn. on Trade of the House Comm.
omi Ways amid Means, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (Statement of Stewart Abercrombie Baker)
[hereinafter Statement of Stewart Abercrombie Baker] (defending the constitutionality of binational
panel review).
7. For a history of dumping. price discrimination, and predatory pricing in relation to
U.S.-Canada trade relations. see Goldman. Competition, Anti-dumping, (and the Canada-U.S. Trade
Neotiations. 12 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 95 (1987).
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This article addresses those constitutional issues relating to the binding
binational panel review provisions that may surface under the FTA. We wish to
appraise these issues, to appraise ways in which potential difficulties have been
resolved by the implementing statute, and to determine whether any other
constitutional questions might properly be considered by federal courts in the
United States.
The constitutional challenge to the FTA's provisions for the appointment of
binational panels rests principally on three grounds. First, the executive and
congressional powers encroach impermissibly upon the core article III judicial
power in the United States Constitution by limiting judicial review under United
States law in federal courts and recognizing this power in a non-article III
international tribunal. Second, the FTA confers authority to interpret and
administer laws of the United States upon persons not appointed in conformity
with the appointments clause of article I. Third, the Congress impermissibly
encroaches upon the President's power faithfully to execute the laws by requiring
direct implementation of binational panel decisions on remand to the adminis-
trative agencies whose orders were under review.
Before addressing these challenges, we briefly review the relevant provisions
of the FTA in relation to domestic antidumping and countervailing duty laws and
the changes in them." We then consider the preliminary question of the
constitutional authority of the United States executive to negotiate and the
Congress to agree on binding binational panel review, as well as questions of
delegation and due process. The precise nature of the principal constitutional
questions should then have a sharper focus.
I. Appointment of Binational Panels to Review
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders
Binding binational panel review of final antidumping and countervailing duty
decisions is a form of supranational review jurisdiction over national decisions
under an international agreement. 9 The FTA does not interfere with each Party's
rights under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to apply its
own antidumping and countervailing duty laws to goods imported from the
territory of the other Party that are unfairly priced to distort comparative
advantage."' It does, however, restrict the ability of each Party to amend existing
antidumping and countervailing duty laws applicable to the other Party and
8. For a discussion of the current framework of antidumping and countervailing duly laws, see
Horlick & DeBusk. Comnmerce Procedhires Under Existing anid Proposed Antidunling/Coioiteroil-
ing Duly Regiultiions. 22 INI'L LAw. 99 (1988).
9. These provisions and the other voluntary tribunals are established in chapter 19 of the VI'A.
For a different view of dispute resolution under the FIA. see Trakman, Pritioiiing Dispute
Resolution tinidr /h Free Trade Agreement: Truth or FiincY:. 40 Mi-. L. Ri'v. 349 (1988).
to. Free Trade Agreement. supra note 1, art. 1902(l).
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provides nonbinding review for compatibility with GATT. 11 Any amendment to
a Party's antidumping or countervailing duty laws must apply specifically to
goods from the other Party. In that case, the Party seeking to amend its laws must
notify the other Party of its intention to do so and consult with the other Party
prior to enactment of the amending statute if the other Party so requests. 12 Any
such amendments must also be consistent with the provisions of the Agreement
on Implementation of article VI of the GATT (the Antidumping Code), the
Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of articles VI, XVI and XXIII
of the GATT (the Subsidies Code), and with the object and purpose of the FTA
itself. 13
Under article 1903 of the FTA, a Party may request that an amendment to the
other Party's antidumping or countervailing duty laws be referred to a panel for
a declaratory opinion as to whether the amendment is consistent with the
above-named agreements. '4 This review is purely advisory and does not bind the
Parties. If the panel determines that a statutory amendment fails to conform to
any of the agreements set forth in article 1902(2)(d), the Parties are required to
begin consultations with a view to resolving the inconsistency within ninety days
of the issuance of the panel's declaratory opinion. 15 If no solution is reached
within this time, the Party that requested the panel is authorized to "take com-
parable legislative or equivalent executive action," or to give notice to the other
Party of its intention to terminate the FTA. 16 This process follows traditional lines
of consultation and reciprocity in carrying out international agreements.
The binding review process, limited to antidumping and countervailing duty
cases, differs significantly. Functionally, although much less complex, the
process is more like supranational review of customs matters handled by the
Court of Justice of the European Economic Community than like traditional
I1. The GATT promotes the reduction of trade barriers (e.g., tariffs, as well as nontariffbarriers)
in an attempt to liberalize trade under multilateral nondiscriminatory and most favored nations
treatment. The GATT is intended to represent for each contracting party a balance of comparative
advantage in the international trade arena. K. DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
OROANIZATION 18-22 (1970).
12. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1902(2)(a)-(c).
13. Id. art. 1902(2)(d).
14. A Party may also ask the panel to determine whether or not a prospective amendment has the
effect of overturning a prior decision of the panel made pursuant to art. 1904 of the FTA, but a
determination that it does would appear to have no effect unless the panel determines that the
amendment also contravenes one or more of the agreements mentioned in art. 1902(2)(d). Article
1903(1) gives the Parties a choice between referring prospective amendments to a panel for a
declaratory opinion as to whether:
(a) the amendment does not conform to the provisions of subparagraph (d)(i) or (d)(ii)
of paragraph 2 of art. 1902; or (b) such amendment has the function and effect of
overturning a prior decision of a panel made pursuant to art. 1904 and does not
conform to the provisions of subparagraph (d)(i) or (d)(ii) of paragraph 2 of art. 1902
(emphasis added).
15. Free Trade Agreement. supra note I, art. 1903(3)(a).
16. Id. art. 1903(3)(b).
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international dispute settlement in the context of a bilateral agreement. For this
reason, the provision jars the existing constitutional framework, for it would
allow private parties to elect to substitute binational panel review for domestic
judicial review of final orders of domestic agencies. Moreover, any remand
following such review would be directed to the politically appointed head of the
agency whose order is reviewed, under both the FTA and the implementing
legislation, to carry out the decision resulting from review.
Article 1904 of the FTA requires that the Parties undertake the legislative action
necessary to accomplish this supranational review of final antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty determinations. 17 Panels are appointed on a casy-by-case basis, ' 8
consisting, for each case, of five individuals selected from a roster of fifty qualified
individuals named by the Parties prior to the entry into force of the FTA. 9
Either Party may request binational panel review of a final antidumping or
countervailing duty determination issued by the competent authority of either
Party to determine whether the final order is consistent with the antidumping or
countervailing duty law of the importing Party. Binational panels must confine
their review of final orders to the administrative record and may rely upon the
relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and
judicial precedents of the importing Party. Under the implementing legislation in
the United States, binational panel decisions create no binding precedent. 20 The
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes of the Parties are incorporated by
reference into the FTA. 2'
A Party to the FTA, either on its own initiative or upon the request of a person
who otherwise would have standing to obtain judicial review of a final order
under the law of the importing Party, may request binational panel review.
2 2
17. Id. art. 1904(!), (15). Under U.S. implementing legislation, only the private U.S. national
with standing to challenge final orders before the International Trade Court under present law with
proper notice may request the United States to trigger binational review proceedings. Without a
private request. the United States may not on its own request binational review. While a statutory
ministerial duty seems to be imposed upon the executive branch, in other parts of the implementing
legislation, mandamus to enforce any aspects of the law is expressly precluded. Implementation Act.
supra note I (Tariff Act of 1930, § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982) anendedby additional subsecs.
(g)(8)(A). (g)(8)(C) (Supp. IV 1986)). This would place the executive in the anomalous position of
being free to breach the FTA by not complying with a request to trigger binational review in violation
of both the FTA and the implementing legislation. without judicial recourse in U.S. courts, unless
some constitutional override would permit review of the question by an article III court. See iifia
note 56 and accompanying text.
18. Free Trade Agreement, sutpra note t. art. 1904(4).
19. Id. annex 1901.2(l)-(3).
20. Implementation Act, supra note I. § 401(d) (Tariff Act of 1930. § 516A(b). 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b), amnended by the addition of para. (3)).
21. Free Trade Agreement. supra note I, art. 1904(2). Countervailing and antidumping are
imposed in the United States in accordance with the Tariff Act of 1930, Subtitle IV. 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 1671 (West 1988): 19 U.SC. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). respectively.
22. Free Trade Agreement. suopra note I. at art. 1904(5). But see Implementation Act. supra
note I (Tariff Act of 1930. § 516A. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. anended bh additional subsection (g)(8)(C))
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Failure to request a binational panel within thirty days after effective notice of a
final order precludes review of the final order by a binational panel.2 3
The authority issuing a final order, and all those who, under the law of their
respective jurisdictions, would have standing to appear and be represented
before a court during judicial review of a final order, have the right to appear
and be represented by counsel before the binational panel, 24 whose decisions
are final and binding.25 In cases where a binational panel determines that a final
order issued by the competent authority of an importing Party is inconsistent
with the laws of that Party with respect to the imposition of antidumping or
countervailing duties, the panel will remand the final order for action not
inconsistent with the panel's decision. Under implementing legislation in the
United States, the remand is communicated directly to the Secretary of
Commerce or to the International Trade Commission.
26
The panel must-set a time limit for compliance with the remand not to exceed
the maximum period of time that is given by the law of the importing Party to its
competent authority to issue a final order.27 Any judicial review of action taken
on remand must be made by the same binational panel within ninety days of the
date on which such action is submitted to it.28 Neither Party may provide for an
appeal from the decision of a binational panel to its domestic courts.29 United
States implementing legislation provides an exception to exclusive binational
panel review for constitutional issues. 30
The provisions of the FTA do not affect the judicial review procedures of
either Party, or cases appealed under those procedures, until agency determina-
tions are final. 3' If neither Party requests establishment of a binational panel
within the time allowed, judicial review under domestic law of either Party may
(for the limitation in U.S. implementing legislation removing the discretion of the executive to
request such review on its own initiative).
23. Free Trade Agreement. siqno'r note I. art. 1904(4).
24. Id. art. 1904(7). Procedures for initiating an investigation of conditions allegedly warrantingthe imposition of a countervailing or aniduniping duty are set forth in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1673a
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
25. Free Trade Agreement. supra note I. art. 1904(9)( I1).
26. Implenentation Act. suipra note I (Tarif Act of 1930, § 516A. 19 U.S.C. 1516a. amendled
hy additional subsec. (g)(7)(A).
27. In countervailing duty cases, see 19 U.S.C. § 167 b(a)-(b) for time limits for issuance of
final orders: in antidulping cascs see 19 I U.S.C. §§ 1673a and 1673b for time limits for issuance of
final ordcrs. see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(c1. 1673b(c). and 1673d(a)(2) for possible time
extensions.
28. Free Trade Agreement. supra note I. art. 1904(8).
29. /I. art. 190411 ). iplementing legislation both removes and limits present judicial review
and further precludes mandam1us. implementation Act. stpr-a note t (Tariff Act of 1930. § 516A, 19
U.S.C. § 15 10a. oitlndeId /)" additional subset. (g)(2). (3)).
30. Ihplementation Act. stpro note I (Tariff Act of 1930. § 516A. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.
amended bv additional subsection (g)(4)).
31. Fyec Trade Agrciment. supra note I. art. 1904( 1 ).
VOL. 23. NO. 2
BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW 407
proceed.32 Furthermore, neither Party may request binational panel review of a
revised final order issued as a direct result of judicial review of a final order in
cases where neither Party requested binational panel review of the original final
order. Finally, neither Party may request binational panel review of a final order
issued as a direct result of judicial review in a court of the importing Party prior
to the entry into force of the FIA.33
The FTA establishes an "extraordinary challenge procedure ' 34 whereby a
Party may challenge the decision of a binational panel on grounds that: (i) a
member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, conflict of interest, or
some other material violation of the rules of conduct devised by the Parties; (2)
the panel departed from a fundamental rule of procedure; (3) the panel exceeded
its authority or jurisdiction as defined by article 1904; or (4) the existence of one
or more of the above-named circumstances "materially affected" the panel's
35decision.
Because the FTA, when implemented, empowers a private party with standing
to elect removal of judicial review from article Ill courts in the United States in
favor of binational panel review, as described above, we turn next to the
preliminary questions of the authority of the executive to negotiate such an
agreement, the power of Congress to limit and create review jurisdiction and
limitations of due process, before discussing the separation of powers questions.
II. Preliminary Constitutional Issues
A. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS
PURSUANT TO A CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
This agreement and its implementation demonstrate the political utiiity of the
congressional-executive agreement form of entering a self-executing interna-
tional agreement, in place of the traditional treaty-making mode under the
Constitution. Executive authority to negotiate an international agreement pro-
viding for binding review of domestic administrative decisions by an interna-
tional tribunal is supported in part by a line of decisions upholding the
32. Pursuant to current U.S. law, if parties subject to a final order respecting the imposition of
countervailing and antidumping duties wish to file a protest against such an order with the Customs
Service, they must do so within 90 days of the issuance of the order. Tariff Act of 1930, § 514, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1515, 28 U.S.C. § 2631(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Court of International
Trade (CIT) has exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest
under Tariff Act of 1930, § 515, 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Such actions must be
commenced within 180 days of the mailing date of the denial of a protest. 28 U.S.C. §§ 263 1(a),
2636(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Decisions of the CIT may be appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1585 (1986).
33. Free Trade Agreement. supra note I. art. 1904(12).
34. Id. annex 1904.13.
35. Id. art. 1904(13).
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constitutionality of executive action taken pursuant to congressional authoriza-
tion rather than under the treaty power exclusively.36 The executive has greatest
power when negotiating under both congressional authority and the President's
treaty and foreign relations powers. 37 In the leading case, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,38 the Supreme Court upheld a broad grant of
discretion to the President under the inherent foreign affairs power, distinguish-
ing between domestic and international executive powers. The latter "most often
accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved.' 
39
Trade and tariff agreements introduce special tension between the President
and the Congress. The executive agreement negotiated under congressional
authorization becomes a favored political device for resolving this tension,
especially under a congressional rule allowing an up or down vote on both the
agreement and the implementing legislation. 40 The President claims executive
power over foreign affairs and seeks political control over the increase to the
national wealth through free trade. The Congress claims power over foreign trade
and tariff revenues and may reflect protectionist or other parochial interests of
constituents injured by the displacements wrought by free trade. Constitutionally,
one question is always how far the Congress can circumscribe the President's
"inherent power" over foreign affairs as interpreted in Curtiss-Wright when
exercised to integrate economic markets for public benefit through massive
elimination of tariffs and barriers as in the FTA.
Although the Supreme Court has not applied the Curtiss-Wright reasoning to
congressional authorization to negotiate trade agreements, in Star-Kist Foods,
Inc. v. United States,4' the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
upheld the Trade Agreements Act of 193442 on similar grounds. In fact, the
constitutional challenge in Star-Kist appears to be stronger than that in Curtiss-
36. RESTATEMENT (TInRD) OF ThE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § I, reporters note
2 (1987).
37. L. HENKIN, FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND TitE CONSTITUTION 105-06 (1972).
38. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
39. Id. at 320: See also L. HENKIN. supra note 37, at 44-50.
40. Congressional approval of the FTA along with the implementing legislation under the
so-called "fast-track" procedure is authorized by The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1982).
Pursuant to § 1103(b) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, 102
Slat. 1107, the applicability of the "fast track" procedures to implementing bills that are submitted
to Congress with respect to bilateral trade agreements (and multilateral trade agreements affecting
tariff barriers) is extended until June I, 1993. provided that the agreement in question is entered into
before June 1, 1991. (The Act provides for extension of this deadline, subject to congressional
approval.)
41. 275 F.2d 472 (1959 C.C.P.A.).
42. TariffAct of 1930. § 350(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), as amendedbv the
Act of June 12, 1934 entitled An Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930. 48 Stat. 943, as firiher
amended bh the Joint Resolution of June 7. 1943, 57 Stat. 125.
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Wright. Unlike the Joint Resolution at issue in Curtiss-Wright, which granted the
President discretion only to restrict trade in specified goods in response to a
discrete set of exigent circumstances, the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 granted
to the President an ongoing discretion to vary the terms of existing legislation,
taking into consideration precisely the type of information that would have been
considered by Congress in amending the relevant legislation under its express
power.
The Star-Kist court acknowledged that there are constitutional limits to
Congress's ability to confer upon the President authority to conclude executive
agreements affecting domestic legislation. A constitutional delegation requires
"a standard or intelligible principle which is sufficient to make it clear when
action is proper. And because Congress cannot abdicate its legislative function
and confer carte blanche authority on the President, it must circumscribe that
power in some manner." 44 The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 contained ade-
quate standards and limits.
The constitutional standard enunciated in Star-Kist operates only to restrict the
President's authority to conclude executive agreements pursuant to a congres-
sional grant of authority. The President always can rely upon the treaty power to
negotiate international agreements, but in matters of foreign trade and tariffs
congressional approval would be necessary in implementation, at some point.
The device of negotiation pursuant to congressional authorization is thus not
merely constitutional but also prudent and efficient. Read together, Curtiss-
Wright and Star-Kist illustrate the breadth of discretion that may be exercised by
the President pursuant to congressional authorization when such discretion is
exercised to assist Congress in the regulation of foreign trade.
Section 102(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, 4 5 as yet unchallenged on constitu-
tional grounds, authorizes the President to "enter into trade agreements with
foreign countries or instrumentalities providing for the harmonization, reduction,
or elimination of [trade] barriers (or other distortions) or providing for the
prohibition of or limitations on the imposition of [trade] barriers (or other
distortions). ' 46 This congressional authorization restricts the President notably
less severely than did the authority at issue in Star-Kist, since it does not limit the
amount by which the President is authorized to reduce existing trade barriers, nor
does it limit the President's authority in reducing trade barriers to the reduction
of duties alone.
In the "harmonization, reduction, or elimination" of trade barriers, Congress
clearly understood in the authorization that action by the President pursuant to
43. 275 F.2d at 480.
44. Id.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
46. Id. The President's authority to enter into trade agreements providing for the reduction or
elimination of barriers to trade, subject to certain statutory conditions, is extended by § 1102 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 40.
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section 102(b) would have the effect of modifying existing legislation establish-
ing trade barriers. Since the President's authority to conclude such agreements
may be circumscribed by time and by requirements that the President adhere to
an enunciated policy and make specific determinations, the delegation and
restrictions meet constitutional standards. While no such grant of authority would
have been required to enable the President to negotiate a treaty, despite the
potential effect of a treaty upon domestic law, proceeding under congressional
authority avoids a potential conflict with the entire Congress over implementation.
The scope of authority granted by section 102(b), however, and of the limits
to the President's discretion in foreign trade initiatives remains uncertain. The
President no doubt could enter into agreements that have the effect of modifying
domestic legislation on one occasion only, that is, at the time the agreement is
concluded. Section 102(b) confers broader authority than did either of the
statutes at issue in Curtiss-Wright or Star-Kist. Agreements providing for a
system under which trade barriers may be harmonized or eliminated over time
reasonably fall within this authorization. Rather than making a mere one-time
adjustment or reduction in specific trade barriers, the President may conclude
agreements for integrating national economies, such as in the Israel-United
States Free Trade Agreement and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment. Under such agreements, dispute resolution procedures may be functionally
needed as part of implementing the free trade regime. This necessity implies
authority to conclude agreements establishing international tribunals for the
binding resolution of certain trade disputes. The authority seems clear as long as
the operation of the tribunals is limited to the purposes of the Act. This implied
authorization, however, might not be sufficient without further specific imple-
menting legislation to remove from domestic courts long-standing judicial
review over certain administrative decisions to guard against protectionist bias
that would threaten the integrity of the agreement.
Obviously, this broad interpretation adds a dimension to the Act not consid-
ered by the courts in Curtiss-Wright or Star-Kist, and its constitutionality cannot
be presumed by reference to those cases alone. Past practice, however, the
absence of any constitutional challenge to the Act, and congressional acquies-
cence support the validity of the FTA and its dispute provisions.4 7
The case of Dames & Moore v. Regan48 most recently shows the deference the
Supreme Court gives the President in establishing international arbitral tribunals
for the settlement of disputes by executive agreement. Although the Court found
47. The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI. XVI, and XXIII of the
GATT. 26th Supp. BISD 56 (1980): Trade Agreement Act of 1979, § 2. 93 Stat. 147 (the Subsidies
Code), concluded pursuant to § 102(b), establishes procedures for consultation, conciliation, and the
settlement of disputes concerning the subsidization of goods for export. This Agreement, and any
others establishing procedures for the settlement of disputes, may be expected to facilitate the
observance of existing or prospective agreements.
48. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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no authorization for the President's suspension of judicial proceedings 49 pending
against Iran and its state enterprises in either the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act or the Hostage Act, 50 the Court found congressional
authorization of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to be implied in
emergency legislation and in Congress's longstanding acquiescence to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments and nationals via executive
agreements. I
In sum, we find no constitutional infirmity in the procedures for binding
binational panel review of antidumping and countervailing duty orders as part of
the FTA negotiated pursuant to a congressional grant of authority for the
harmonization, reduction, and elimination of barriers to trade. The only question
that conceivably might arise is whether the elimination of judicial review of a
longstanding domestic practice affecting private expectations falls within that
authority. Even that question, however, is cured by congressional approval of the
FTA and implementing legislation, so long as no impermissible encroachment
upon the judicial power thereby occurs.
B. BASES OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO AUTHORIZE
BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW
Binational panel review in the FTA raises constitutional questions not
answered by decisions that merely affirm Congress's power to regulate foreign
commerce. 5 2 Article 1904 of the FTA provides that "the Parties shall replace
judicial review of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with
binational panel review.' 53 Under an important corollary, "[a] final determina-
tion shall not be reviewed under any judicial review procedures of the importing
Party if either Party requests a panel with respect to that determination within the
time limits set forth [in article 1904].''5 Through implementing legislation
"[t]he Parties shall . . . amend their statutes and regulations, as necessary, with
respect to antidumping or countervailing duty proceedings ' 55 in order to give
effect to the provisions of this article. For the United States, these provisions
meant enacting limitations on the review jurisdiction of the Court of International
Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to hear challenges to final
49. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-75.
50. Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, § 203, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1702);
Rev. Stat. § 2001, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982).
51. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-82. The Court cites Congress's enactment of the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982). and
the establishment of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission as support for Congress's implied
approval of this method of claims settlement.
52. See Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824): McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
53. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1904(l).
54. Id. art. 19041I).
55. Id. art. 1904(15).
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orders of the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission
with respect to antidumping and countervailing duties and empowering binational
panels to conduct final review under United States law. The legislative and judicial
history of these courts indicates that they are article III courts, and not legislative
courts. 56 Even if the executive agrees, does Congress have power in effect to
transfer this judicial review by article III courts to an international tribunal? While
the separation of powers part of this question is addressed later, for the moment
we briefly review the basis for congressional power to limit judicial review.
Article 1, section 8, clause 9 of the Constitution gives Congress the power
"[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." Article III, section 7
gives Congress authority to vest judicial power in "such inferior Courts as [it]
may from time to time ordain and establish." Congress has created the Court of
International Trade and the court of appeals inferior to the Supreme Court. Can
it now limit the jurisdiction of those courts? Justice Story thought Congress was
under the duty to establish inferior courts and therefore had narrow power to
limit their jurisdiction.57 Others likewise have argued that the vesting of judicial
power in federal courts under article III insulates them from congressional
interference in the extent of their jurisdiction. 58 Rejecting those views, the
Supreme Court stated:
ITIhe political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a few specified
instances (enumerated in article 111, section 2)), belongs to Congress. If Congress has
given the power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise; and if Congress has not
given the power to us, or to any other court, it still remains at the legislative disposal. 59
56. The United States Court of International Trade, created by the Customs Court Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1728 (1980). was preceded by the United States Customs Court and,
before it. the United States Board of General Appraisers. Prior to the creation of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-164. 96 Stat. 25, that court's jurisdiction with respect to customs and international trade
matters was exercised by the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United
States Court of Customs Appeals. In Eparte Bakelite Corp.. 279 U.S. 438 (1929), the United States
Court of Customs Appeals, created by § 28 of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch.
6. 36 Stat. II. and the United States Customs Court. created by the Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411.
44 Stat. 669 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 251 et seq.). were declared to be legislative courts under
article I and. therefore, entirely dependent upon Congress for their powers. Congress subsequently
passed legislation stating that these courts were intended to be article II courts, vested with the
judicial power of article 111. and with judges who would hold office independent of any restrictions
imposed by Congress. Act of July 14. 1956 (Customs Court), § I. 70 Stat. 532 (1956): Act of
Aug. 25. 1958 (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals), § I, 72 Stat. 848 (1958). In Glidden v.
Zdanok. 370 U.S. 530 (1961), the Supreme Court recognized Congress's expressed wish and, after
reconsideration of the character of the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
determined that they were indeed article III courts. The names of the courts were subsequently changed
and their jurisdiction expanded and confirmed. Customs Court Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-271,84
Stat. 274 (1970): Customs Court Act of 1980. supra note 56: Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97- 164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). See CITBA Statement, supra note 6, at 11-4.
57. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 253 (1845) (dissent).
58. See L. TRIon. infra note 67. at 5 1-52.
59. Turner v. The President. Directors. & Company of the Bank of N.A., I L. Ed. 718, 719 n. 1
(1799).
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This view was affirmed in Ex parte McCardle, 60 which upheld Congress's
restriction of the Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals in cases of habeas corpus.
Ex parte McCardle dealt only with the repeal of a statute constituting the
source of the Court's jurisdiction over particular types of cases. In contrast,
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 6' decided fifty-two years earlier, had held that
Congress may not interfere with the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts over
disputes listed in article III of the Constitution. Although the ruling in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee was unaffected by Ex parte McCardle, it has since been
overridden by a series of cases.6 2 More recently and with great importance to
binational panel review, the Supreme Court in Palmore v. United States
determined that not all cases within the judicial power of the United States must
be heard and decided by an article III court.63 Moreover, in the Second Circuit
international agreements having constitutional status equal to acts of Congress
"may operate . . . as limitations on [the] diversity jurisdiction" of federal
courts. 64 The cases clearly support the interpretation that Congress has the power
to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts with respect to cases "arising under...
the laws of the United States," and "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. ' 65
III. Separation of Powers Issues:
Encroachment on Judicial Power
A. REVIEW JURISDICTION IN NON-ARTICLE Ill TRIBUNAL
Professor Richard Fallon argues that judicial review of the decisions of
legislative courts and administrative agencies might be necessary to the preser-
vation of the separation of powers. His argument and analysis logically applied
also to the binational panel review of agency orders and in extraordinary
challenge procedures. "Appellate review," Fallon suggests, "affords an oppor-
tunity to correct legal errors, including those that may have resulted from the
kind of political influence on judicial decision making that article III was
intended to prevent." 66 While this analysis at first seems inapposite to the
decisions rendered by a binational tribunal that is subject to the control of neither
the executive nor the legislative branches of the federal government, careful
scrutiny reveals the potential political nature of the panels and their control in
60. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
61. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
62. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) and Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323,
329-30 (1938) held that the lower federal courts derive their jurisdiction solely from Congress's
exercise of its power to ordain and establish such courts.
63. 411 U.S. 389, 397-404 (1973).
64. Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, 452 F.2d 798, 802 (2d Cir. 1971).
65. U.S. CONSr. art. 111, § 2.
66. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article /I/, 101 HARv. L. REV.
916, 939 (1988).
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constitution and process by the political branches especially after a request
removes a final order from domestic review. In binational panel review, the
international agreement and legislation guide decisions, but accountability for
abuse is subject to special procedures for appointment and peremptory challenge,
or extraordinary review by panels appointed by the governments, under
considerable political discretion.
The FTA builds-in structural limitations as well as a limited discretionary
framework. The review procedures expire after seven years or sooner if the
parties harmonize the domestic laws of antidumping and countervailing duties.
Neither the President nor Congress may act unilaterally to alter the jurisdiction
of the binational panels once the FTA goes into effect, although they may
amend the applicable domestic statutes to be applied by the panels (subject to a
declaratory opinion procedure by a binational panel); thus, executive or
legislative influence over a binational panel once established is minimal. Do the
political branches impermissibly encroach upon the judicial power by excluding
judicial review of decisions of legislative courts or administrative agencies in
cases requiring review by an article III court? We think it highly unlikely but
possible for a constitutional question to arise requiring U.S. judicial review.
The implementing legislation provides the means to make such a constitutional
challenge. Were that to occur, and Canada believes it should be foreclosed, the
question of breach of the provision between the two countries foreclosing
judicial review of the agreement in domestic courts would require consultation
between the governments. Before reaching that point, however, let us review
the constraints within the constitutional power of Congress to limit judicial
review even without the benefits of a reciprocal agreement with Canada.
These restraints differ from the other constitutional limits Gn all national
power. 67
B. CONGRESS's AUTHORITY TO LIMIT THE JURISDICTION
OF CUSTOMS COURTS AND TO IMPLEMENT THE LIMITATION
REQUIRED BY THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The customs bar opposed the removal of judicial review from the Court of
International Trade to binational panels for several reasons. 68 First, the limitation
accompanying removal would deny judicial review by article III courts in
customs matters with deep historic roots grounded in the common law actions of
assumpsit, trover, and replevin, which protect private interests. Second, the
forum created does not satisfy constitutional expectations of regularity and due
67. L. TRWim. AMEiRICAN CONsTruriONAL LAw 47 (2d ed. 1988).
68. CITBA Statement. supra note 6.
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process in the operation of temporary panels in applying United States law and
may also violate separation of powers principles.
Even before Ex parte McCardle, however, the Supreme Court had determined
that Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the old Customs Court.
In Cary v. Curtis the Court upheld Congress's elimination of the jurisdiction of
customs and all federal courts to hear and decide actions in assumpsit against
customs collectors. 69 The Court pointed out that:
[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its origin in the Constitution,
is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court), dependent for
its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the
action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the
Supreme Court), for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them with
jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for
the public good. 7°
Although the Court did not directly address the due process concerns of the
plaintiffs in Cary v. Curtis, it did point out that other avenues of redress remained
open to persons in the plaintiffs' position who disagreed with the imposition of
customs duties. Such persons might refuse to deposit the duties exacted by a
customs collector and, when their merchandise was detained as a consequence,
proceed to file an action in trover or replevin. 7 t Congress then clarified its policy
and allowed judicial review. 72
The FTA restriction upon the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit differs in two important respects
from that rejected by Congress in the Act of February 26, 1845. First, the FTA
and implementing legislation do not automatically destroy a private party's
ability to challenge in domestic courts final orders in antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases. They do create a disability in recourse to the courts for thirty
days in order to give both Parties to the FTA an opportunity to challenge the final
order before a binational panel. 73 As the Supreme Court noted in Dames &
Moore, a suspension of "claims" that property was taken under the fifth
amendment does not, by itself, divest the federal courts completely of "juris-
diction" over such claims. In Dames & Moore the Court concluded that the
adjudication of the claims of U.S. citizens to Iranian assets by an International
Claims Tribunal did not wholly divest the courts of jurisdiction, since constitu-
69. 44 U.S. 236 (1845).
70. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 249.
72. In the Act of February 26, 1845, 5 Stat. 727, Congress provided that the 1839 Act was not
to be construed to impair the right of persons who pay duties under protest to bring an action against
the collector in order to ascertain the propriety of the collector's demand for the payment of duties.
See CITBA Statement, supra note 6, at 10.
73. Free Trade Agreement, supra note I, art. 1904(4).
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tional claims for the taking of property, left unsatisfied by the Claims Tribunal,
will "revive" and may be brought in United States courts.74 The FTA does not
require such a strained interpretation in order to be read as preserving the
jurisdiction of domestic courts over final orders, subject to party choice. 75 A
proper party may challenge a final order respecting antidumping or countervail-
ing duties in a domestic court thirty days after publication of the order, provided
that neither Party requests binational panel review of the final order.76
Second, the FTA does not deprive the plaintiff of a review forum. The injured
party will have a choice of forum in which to challenge a final order, either a
binational panel or the Court of International Trade. Furthermore, there is
symmetry. Each forum is similarly confined to a review of a final domestic order
based upon the administrative record. Each forum must also apply the anti-
dumping and countervailing duty laws of the jurisdiction in which the final order
originated. This reciprocal arrangement is unique in that the binational forum
must apply the domestic law of each country, within the interpretive context of
the GATT principles of nondiscrimination.
Either for its own reasons or for implementing the reciprocal benefits of the
FTA, Congress has power to limit domestic judicial review over specific
administrative decisions.
C. CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE TO THE BINATIONAL
PANELS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. LAW
Without much doubt, Congress may create and limit the jurisdiction of the
Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in international trade matters. May Congress and the President constitutionally
empower a binational panel to review and decide under U.S. law challenges to
final orders issued by the Department of Commerce or the International Trade
Commission? We think Congress clearly has power, although limited, to create
review jurisdiction over cases "within the judicial power of the United
States" in forums that do not qualify as article III courts, as affirmed in
Palmore. The constraint theoretically is part of separation of powers analysis,
emerging from the distinction between adjudication of "private rights"
74. 453 U.S. 654, 684-85 (1981). Professor Tribe strongly criticizes this decision. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 67, at 241-42.
75. The relationship between the Parties and private persons in exercising this choice is
considered in part III infra.
76. Free Trade Agreement, supra note I. art. 1904(4), (15)(g). Under implementing legislation
in the United States only a proper private party may trigger such a request, in which case the United
States must initiate the proceeding with Canada. The United States as a party is foreclosed by statute
from triggering such a request on its own initiative, even though the FTA permits such an action. See
supra note 17.
VOL. 23, NO. 2
BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW 417
requiring article III courts and adjudication of "public rights" by non-article
III forums.77 A line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Northern Pipeline
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,78 suggests that international trade cases such
as those that may be decided by the Canada-U.S. binational panels, are
"public rights" controversies. Disputes over administrative decisions on
welfare or other benefits conferred by government action need not be
adjudicated by article II courts, except for constitutional deprivation in
process.79 In contrast, "private rights" disputes, especially claims for
infringement of fundamental private rights or liberties (or other acquired
rights), require adjudication by article III courts. At once we recognize the
artificiality of this distinction and its unsatisfactory grounding in nineteenth
century formalism. 80 For the present, however, our discussion will not extend
beyond recent cases purporting to furnish guidance for limiting the scope of
review in non-article III forums.
In Northern Pipeline the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to hear and decide "all civil proceedings arising
under title 11 (bankruptcy) of the United States Code or arising from or related
to cases under title 1 .,8' The Supreme Court held that, with certain exceptions,
"[tihe judicial power of the United States must be exercised by courts having the
attributes prescribed in Article IIl. ' ' 82 The Court referred to language in
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.83 stating that Congress
may not "withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature,
is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty." Matters
forming the basis of a suit at common law or in equity are identified by the Court
as "private rights," the adjudication of which lies at the core of historically
recognized judicial power. 84
By contrast, the requirements of article III do not bar the creation of legislative
courts to adjudicate cases involving "public rights." 8 5 "The doctrine [of public
rights]," the Court explained, extends only to matters arising "between the
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the
performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
77. For a critical analysis of review of public rights in different context, see Fallon, supra note
66, at 951.
78. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
79. The most recent expression is in Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988), reaffirming the
right of the Director of the CIA to fire an employee subject only to review for constitutional error.
80. Fallon, supra note 66, at 928.
81. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
82. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 59.
83. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
84. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70.
85. Id. at 64-67.
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departments, ' 86 "and only to matters that historically could have been deter-
mined exclusively by those departments.
' 87
In two recent cases the Supreme Court has begun to apply the public rights
theory to sustain non-article 11I adjudications required by Congress. In Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.88 the Court upheld provisions of a
statute that required binding arbitration of amounts of compensation for using
proprietary research information previously filed by another company, as an
incentive to register products with the Environmental Protection Agency.89 In the
view of the Court, the public rights doctrine "reflects simply a pragmatic
understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving
matters that 'could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative
Branches,' the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced." 90 In
Commoditv Futures Trading Commission v. Schor 9 1 the Court determined that
Congress constitutionally could confer limited jurisdiction upon a government
agency to hear a narrow class of common law claims incident to the agency's
primary adjudicative function.
The jurisdiction of binational panels under the FTA is confined to the review
of final orders in antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. Despite
the long tradition of court review and early common law writs, we think this
process involves public rights as defined in recent Supreme Court decisions and
not private rights.92 The parties to any dispute before a binational panel will be
contesting the imposition, or failure to impose, antidumping or countervailing
duties, an action which Congress and the executive could decide conclusively
under their own powers, especially in wealth-creating trade measures for the
common good of the national economy. The correction of market distortions for
the broader purpose of greater wealth and economic integration and the
adjustments necessary to avoid unfair competition are public problems ill-suited
for traditional adjudication. Binational panel review checks against any under-
lying bias in applying U.S. law on a reciprocal basis for Canada.
86. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
87. Id. at 68.
88. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
89. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA]. Manufacturers seeking to
register a product with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under FIFRA may rely upon
research data previously submitted to the EPA by another manufacturer, provided that compensation
is paid to the earlier registrant and that compensation disputes as to amount due are to be resolved
through binding arbitration. When Union Carbide challenged the constitutionality of the requirement,
the Court held that the arbitral decision would be subject to judicial review only for "fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct." Id. at 573-77. citing FIFRA § 3(c)( I)(D)(ii), 61 Stat. 163,
as amended by 92 Stat. 819 (current version codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(C)(l)(D)(ii), (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
90. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 589 (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982)) (citing
Crowell v. Benson. 285 U S. 22, 50 (1932)).
91. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
92. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
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The strongest argument for requiring article III court review is that in the long
history of court review of customs duties, the common law actions of assumpsit,
trover or replevin were available, creating expectations of court protection of
preexisting private interests from government abuse. This long tradition might
have created the expectation that judicial review would continue in article III
courts. The FTA, however, creates additional reciprocal benefits. Binational
panel review also provides U.S. exporters with a forum in which to challenge
any protectionist bias in antidumping and countervailing duty orders of the
Canadian Government.
While the review of final orders as "public rights" fits within this recent trend,
the textual labels do introduce a circularity broken only by reference to broader
questions of purpose underlying separation of powers. Congressional and
executive action conferring binding review jurisdiction over these orders in a
binational panel falls well within settled constitutional limits because actions by
the political branches do not threaten the independence of judicial power. The
power to limit jurisdiction of article III courts, the power to authorize dispute
settlement in international trade agreements, and the power to establish review of
public rights matters in administrative tribunals, all dwell in Congress. Taken
together, these powers allow Congress to remove review over antidumping and
countervailing duty orders from article III courts to binational panels under the
FTA. Any such delegation of quasi-judicial review authority to a binational
panel, however, must also be constitutionally defensible against an attack on due
process grounds.
IV. Due Process Concerns
Agreeing to binational panel review of domestic decisions in international
trade disputes bears little resemblance to international agreements subjecting
citizens to actions placing their life, liberty, or property in jeopardy without
consent or protection of their constitutional rights through an article III court. 9 3
Even determinations affecting private interests based upon statutory privilege or
entitlements must accord minimum constitutional rights of procedural due
process.94 We think binational panel review facially protects these minimum due
process rights of private parties in conformance with constitutional standards.
This conclusion follows analysis of three aspects of due process concerns.
A. DELEGATION
By itself, is congressional approval of jurisdiction in binational panels to
review final orders in antidumping and countervailing duty cases an impermis-
93. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
94. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cleveland Bd. v. Laudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985);
Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988).
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sible delegation to experts without adequate guidance, thereby denying due
process of law to affected parties? Facially, in the FTA and implementing
legislation the authorization seems quite clear and free from due process
problems of adequate notice of standards. The standards of review are those
traditionally applied in U.S. law. The panel of experts is appointed by the two
governments and operates within clear guidelines of the FTA, subject to
extraordinary challenge procedures in the event of alleged abuse. This delegation
does not reach even as far as Berman v. Parker,95 which permitted congressional
delegation of administrative authority to a private venture to make eminent
domain decisions under a predetermined plan. 96 Once a legislative objective is
within the authority of Congress, "the means by which it will be attained is also
for Congress to determine." 97
The delegation of the power of eminent domain to a private party under a
predetermined plan on its face extends far beyond placing quasi-judicial review
authority in a binational panel appointed by two governments. Berman, however,
stands for an important proposition that is equally applicable to both situations.
If an objective properly falls within the authority of Congress, and Congress
seeks to attain that objective through the delegation of authority to entities that
are not constituent parts controlled exclusively by the government, such a
delegation of power does not automatically violate the due process rights of those
affected. Congress may delegate quasi-judicial power to administrative bodies
and other entities, so long as adequate legislative standards are provided. No
article III court is required to adjudicate the matter. For example, if the required
compensation paid under an eminent domain power did not meet constitutional
standards, access to an article III court must be preserved.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Union Carbide, Congress may recognize
binding dispute resolution by a non-article II arbitral forum not subject to
ordinary judicial review 98 when the arbitral forum resolves cases incidental to
those involving public rights, so long as the legislative policy guiding decision
is sufficiently clear. A binational panel drawn from qualified persons in a larger
roster designated by governments, applying U.S. law and subject to extraordi-
nary challenge procedures, is functionally the equivalent of binding arbitration,
95. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In that fifth amendment taking case. challenged the congressional
delegation, to a private venture, of the power of eminent domain under a redevelopment plan by the
National Capital Planning Commission over properties within the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs
argued that congressional action violated the fifth amendment provisions that *.[n]o person shall ...
be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law: nor shall private property be taken for
public use. without just compensation." Id. at 31.
96. Id. at 31.
97. Id. at 33.
98. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568,573-74 (1985), involved
a statute which provided tbr judicial review only in cases of "fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct." It may be noted that the FTA also provides for safeguards where the procedure of a
binational panel is brought into question. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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under procedures approved in Union Carbide99 and international procedures in
Dames & Moore. 1o When decisions review public rights matters, without more,
the delegation to a binational review panel with standards on its face meets
constitutional due process standards. 101
B. DISABILITY TO CHALLENGE No JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISION
To challenge statutes precluding judicial review of decisions by an adminis-
trative body with exclusive jurisdiction over "public rights" determinations, a
claimant must first show that the administrative body, or its procedures, are
incapable of affording due process. 102 Where administrative procedures are
available, a claimant's disability to press the claim in a federal court is not,
without more, a denial of due process of law.103 After a Party elects to seek
binational panel review, the FTA and implementing legislation preclude judicial
review in U.S. courts of final orders respecting antidumping and countervailing
duties. No interested parties are denied due process of law for the sole reason that
they cannot press their claims for judicial review in federal court. It would not
matter that the exclusion is triggered by another party who requests binational
review. All interested parties have the option of requesting through their
respective governments binational panel review of the final order within a
thirty-day period. Because this choice of forum is fairly available to all affected
parties through their governments, any challenge to the exclusion must show that
the binational panels as constituted are incapable of affording due process in
reviewing final orders. To hear such a claim in proper cases, however, article III
courts must always be available.'04
Might U.S. beneficiaries of the FTA be estopped from challenging the
jurisdiction of the binational panels even for a constitutional question such as
denial of due process or denial of private rights? This view might find support in
Rosado v. Civiletti, 105 which upheld the Mexico-United States Treaty on the
Execution of Penal Sentences. 106 Under the treaty, U.S. citizens incarcerated in
Mexican prisons are permitted to serve out their sentences in American prisons,
but are not permitted access to U.S. courts in order to challenge their convictions
99. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 571.
100. Dames & Moore v. Regan. 453 U.S. 654, 678-82 (1981). For discussions of Canadian and
U.S. reception of international commercial arbitration, see Brierly. Canadian Acceptance of
International Commercial Arbitration, 40 ME. L. REV. 287 (1988); Carbonneau. The Reception of
Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263 (1988).
101. H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 5 (1988) Ihereinafter HOUSE REPORT.
102. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 434 (1944).
103. Id.
104. Fallon, supra note 66.
105. 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980).
106. Mexico-United StatesTreaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, 28 U.S.T.
7399. T.I.A.S. No. 8718, reprinted in S. ExEc. Doc. D. 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3244 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) Ihereinafter Execution of Penal Sentences].
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or sentences under U.S. law.' t 7 Certain parties had access to U.S. courts to
challenge the constitutionality of the treaty, but the courts would not review the
underlying basis for the conviction in Mexico even if without due process.",
Since there was mutual benefit and the prisoner presumably would not be worse
off, the waiver of the constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty without
due process was sufficient to preclude jurisdiction, on a petition of habeas
corpus, despite Reid i% Covert. "'9
Although interested parties under the FTA will not be required to forgo any
benefits in order to preserve their access to U.S. courts, neither will they be
compelled by the FTA to forfeit their right to due process of law or to raise
constitutional questions on any aspect of the agreement or implementing
legislation in an article III court. to We think it highly unlikely that a due process
question would not be resolved under the FTA procedures, but the possibility
remains.
C. PROVISIONS OF THE ETA THAT FACIAI.LY
MLET RiEQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS
Chapter Nineteen of the FTA preserves the essentials of notice and fairness
constitutionally required in cases of potential loss by government action in the
United States. Binational panels must confine their review of final orders of U.S.
agencies to the administrative record.'' and must adhere to the standard of
review set forth in the ETA as well as to the general legal principles that the Court
of International Trade would apply to review a final order.'t
2
Any person who otherwise would have had access to a domestic court to
challenge a final order may elect exclusive access to a binational panel by
requesting such review through the appropriate government. The government
must comply.'' 3 When the government triggers review, the possibility of
domestic judicial review of the final order terminates. Review of a final order by
a binational panel would be precluded if a proper person does not request such
review within thirty days of publication of the final order. In that event, any
107. The court noted that under the terms of the treaty. "each transferring prisoner is required to
consent to his transfer. and is permitted to contest the legalit.y of anv change of custody in the courts
ofthe receiving notion." Rosado. 621 F.2d at 1182 (citing Execution of Penal Sentences. supra note
106. art. IV. para. 2. art. V. para. 1:18 U.S.C. § 3244(5)) (emphasis added). Paust is highly critical
of this decision. See Pausi. Tite Unconstitutional Detention of Mexican & Canadian Prisoners by the
United States Government. 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67 (1979).
108. The treaty. of course, required the prisoner's consent before transfer. Execution of Penal
Sentences. supra note 106. art. 4. 1 2, art. 5. 1 1.
109. Execution of Penal Sentences. slqpra note 106.
I 10. Implementation Act. supra note I (Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986), aniended by the addition of subsec. (g)(4)(A)).
I 1. Free Trade Agreement, stqro note 1. art. 1904(5).
112. id. art. 1904(3): Implementation Act. supra note 1, § 516a(b)(l)(A). (B).
113. Free Trade Agreement. supra note 1. art. 1904(5).
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person with standing to challenge the final order may then proceed to do so in a
domestic court,' 14 but not until after it notified all other parties with standing to
request a binational panel of its intention to seek domestic review. This notice
must be given at least ten days prior to expiration of the thirty-day period. "15 The
notice requirement avoids a race to domestic judicial review as a means to close
off binational review.
The two Parties and all persons who otherwise would have had standing to
appear and be represented in a domestic judicial review proceeding will also have
the right to appear and be represented by counsel before a panel. 116 In addition,
to guard further against potential abuses of constitutional limitations, either
government as Party may invoke the extraordinary challenge procedure' 7 if it
thinks a decision taken by a binational panel does not meet standards of due
process. Under the U.S. implementing act, the U.S. may initiate such a
procedure only on request of a private party. The question remains whether, if
either government fails to initiate extraordinary challenge procedures when clear
evidence of abuse is furnished by a private party, a constitutional claim may be
made before a federal court. In summary, the provisions of the Free Trade
Agreement relating to the establishment of binational panels on their face seem
to provide adequate due process protection. In addition, implementing legislation
preserves the jurisdiction of article III courts to review constitutional questions
brought by private parties not remedied by the FTA's procedures.' 18 Unless
serious failure of fundamental fairness or abuse of discretion in the extraordinary
challenge process were to occur, the due process accorded would be substantially
the same as that given a private party in the Court of International Trade.
V. Separation of Powers: Encroachment on
Appointment, Control, and Removal Powers
Binding binational panel review has raised the possibility that in its imple-
menting statute Congress may encroach impermissibly upon the executive
branch through limiting the executive's appointment, control or removal powers.
In United States v. Germaine' 19 the Supreme Court concluded that "all persons
who can be said to hold an office under the government" must be appointed in
the manner prescribed by the Appointments clause. The Appointments clause
effectively restricts the exercise of executive authority by persons not properly
appointed. By the implementing legislation, panel members are not employees of
114. Id. arts. 1904(4), 1904(02a).
115. Id. art. 1904(15g).
116. Id. art. 1904(7).
117. Id. art. 1904(13): see also supra note I.
118. Implementation Act, supra note I (Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A. 19 U.S.C. 1516a (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). amended by the addition of subsec. (g)(4)(A)).
119. 99 U.S. 508. 509-10 (1879).
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the United States.' 20 As members of an international tribunal, no executive
function is performed, so why might a problem arise? The arguments are: (1)
Panels may not exercise executive power of directing a remand to an executive
agency if they are not appointed under the Appointments clause; and (2) if panels
are independent, then they may not by remand direct agencies under remand
except through the President (effectively allocating to the President the exclusive
power to decide whether to breach the international agreement by executive
failure to direct implementation of a panel decision). 121
We shall examine these arguments through various settings in which the
Supreme Court has considered related separation of powers arguments.
A. APPOINTMENTS TO ELECTIONS COMMISSION: CONGRESSIONAL
ENCROACHMENT ON EXECUTIVE'S POWER OF CONTROL
The appointment, control and removal argument finds some support in the
Supreme Court's decisions in Buckley v. Valeo122 and Bowsher v. Synar. 123 In
Buckley, appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, partly because appointment of members to an adminis-
trative commission under the Act did not satisfy the Appointments Clause. Of the
eight members who comprised the commission, two were to be appointed by the
President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House, and two
by the President (all subject to confirmation of both Houses of Congress). The
Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House would serve as ex officio,
nonvoting members. The Act empowered the commission to conduct investiga-
tions into campaign expenditures subject to regulation by the Act, to serve as a
"clearinghouse" for information filed pursuant to the Act, to promulgate rules
and issue advisory opinions for the purpose of implementing the Act, and to
execute the Act's provisions through the adoption of informal procedures, the
issuance of administrative determinations, and the filing of civil suits against
violators. The Supreme Court concluded that, although the Commission could
exercise such investigative and informative powers as Congress might otherwise
delegate to one of its own committees, it could not constitutionally exercise the
administrative and executive powers conferred upon it by the Act, since such
powers are reserved exclusively to "Officers of the United States" appointed in
conformity with the Appointments clause. 124
Since members of traditional international tribunals in general and the
members of the FTA's binational panels in particular are not officers or
120. Implementation Act. supra note 1, § 405(b).
121. See generally L. TRIBE. supra note 67, at 246.
122. 424 U.S. I(1976).
123. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
124. Id. at 3192.
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employees of the United States,' 2 5 we think the above analysis does not apply at
the appointment stage (which includes an interagency group advising the Trade
Representative who compiles a list of qualifying persons in consultation with
congressional committees) but may apply at the implementation or control
stage. 126 While we think a question fairly may be raised, we also think that
where a congressional-executive agreement becomes supreme law of the land,
the duty upon an agency to execute directly a panel's decision to remand is no
different from an act of Congress placing a similar duty upon an agency. 127 Were
direct implementation to be mandated to the agency on direct remand bypassing
the President's control, a serious problem indeed might result. The implementing
legislation, however, apparently cures the problem by anticipating the objection
and curing it in advance by sending any remand through the President should the
direct route prove unconstitutional. 128 In effect, this channel would leave the
President with the executive decision to order remand or to breach a duty under
the FTA.
B. CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON
EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND REMOVAL OF OFFICERS
Binational panel review arguably may violate the Appointments clause, absent
proper accountability, for two reasons: first, neither the Canadian nor the U.S.
members of the binational panels who apply U.S. law will be officers under
article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution; and second, the binational panels
will have the authority to administer U.S. law (also incorporated by reference
into the agreement), a power which in Buckley and Bowsher is reserved to
officers of the United States appointed in conformity with the Appointments
clause. Analytically, we think this argument depends upon whether the panel can
order a remand directly or must go through the President who has agreed to
implement thereby providing political accountability. If the latter, the only
meaningful difference would be that the executive may have non-reviewable
power to breach an international agreement. As we explain later, we have
difficulty with the proposition that the executive may not be held to a duty before
an article III court when created by congressional-executive agreement and
implementing legislation.
In Myers v. United States12 9 the Supreme Court held that Congress may not
125. Implementation Act, supra note I, annex 1901.2.
126. Implementation Act, supra note I, § 405(a)(1)(c).
127. Implementation Act, supra note 1, § 405(b). The United States Secretariat to be established
in a federal agency under § 405(e) of the Implementation Act is not an agency of the U.S.
Government, under 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1982) but its facilitative mission remains under executive
control.
128. Implementation Act, supra note I (Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). amended by the addition of subsec. (g)(7)(B)).
129. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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require congressional approval when the President removes an officer appointed
by him with the advice and consent of the Senate. As the Supreme Court pointed
out more recently in Bowsher, an officer of the United States appointed and
confirmed pursuant to article II, section 2, may be removed by Congress only
upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate
for "Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."' 30 In Bowsher,
the Court struck the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
(Gramm-Rudman Act) for encroaching on executive power. The Act charged the
Comptroller General, an arm of the Congress, with the duty to review the federal
budget deficit, to recommend cuts and to effect certain cuts should Congress and
the President fail to enact conforming legislation. The Court concluded that
implementing the legislative mandate is "the very essence of 'execution' of the
law,"' 31 and that by conferring this responsibility upon the Comptroller General,
Congress had given him an essentially executive power. Under Presidential
control, that delegation could stand. Under 31 U.S.C. section 703(e)(1),
however, the Comptroller General may be removed by a joint resolution of
Congress "at any time" for reasons of permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect
of duty, malfeasance, or the commission of a felony or conduct involving moral
turpitude. The Court held that Congress could not constitutionally reserve for
itself the power to remove an officer charged with the execution of the laws
except by impeachment. "To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an
officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in
Congress control over the execution of the laws." 132 These cases would pose
more difficult questions for the appointment of binational panel members if in
effect they remain under congressional control. Since Congress has denied U.S.
members the status of U.S. Government employees, the question of control and
removal of panel or roster members as between the executive and Congress
becomes urgent only if political accountability for any panel remand is absent.
All panel members are appointed under authority of an international agree-
ment, where until peremptory challenges and a fifth member is designated, the
panel is not constituted. At most, the executive (the Trade Representative), after
consultation with committees of Congress and an interagency group, appoints
twenty-five members of a roster of fifty qualified persons from which the panel
of five may (but not must) be appointed. The claim that an international
procedure violates the Appointments clause differs significantly from the
constitutional meaning in those cases where one political branch is encroaching
internally upon the powers of another political branch. In both Buckley and
Bowsher the Court reasoned that the exercise of executive authority by persons
not appointed in conformity with the Appointments clause was impermissible
130. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 720; see also U.S. CONST. art. I!, § 4.
131. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722.
132. Id. at 721; see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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when Congress retained control over the appointees in question. By giving
Congress the power to remove (through means other than impeachment) persons
with the authority to administer and execute the laws, the Federal Election
Campaign Act and the Gramm-Rudman Act created excessive legislative
intrusion upon the core function of executive accountability to the people to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, expressly preserved apart from
congressional power by the Constitution.
Unless the statutory requirement that the executive consult with the Congress
in making appointments to the panel of fifty and subsequently in the designation
for specific panels and their removal is undue interference with the executive's
foreign relations power, we see no undue encroachment on the executive power
to appoint under the agreement. Indeed, we think the shared arrangements for
controlling the U.S. panel members fall well within the shared power over
international trade within both branches. Moreover, as Professor Henkin wrote to
the House Judiciary Committee, the President's power to implement the
agreement derives from the international community of nations as a duty under
international law. 133 Other encroachments upon the executive's power might
exist under the FTA, as we explain later.
C. CONGRESSIONAL CONDITIONS FOR APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL
OF QUASi-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Congress may impose conditions on the removal of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial officers charged with rule-making and with determining whether
the law is being properly followed. 134 The binational panels to be appointed
pursuant to the FTA will be quasi-judicial under the foreign relations function to
provide review and reciprocal fairness insuring against protectionist bias in
administrative orders that apply each country's antidumping and countervailing
duty laws. 135 This function supports the FTA's overriding purpose to create a
vast, North American free market. After a period of time, the panel review
process expires by its own terms, presumably at which time each country's
internal trade laws will be harmonized with the other's.
The panels have no exclusive internal administrative or executive function.
Each panel will be appointed to hear an existing controversy concerning the
administration of the antidumping or countervailing duty laws of Canada or
the United States. The lack of a provision for removal probably means that the
executive of each country may remove an expert from the panel of fifty by
revision of the roster, but may not remove a particular panel member once chosen
to review an order. The panels' decisions will be binding upon the Parties, who
133. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 15.
134. 295 U.S. 602 (1935); L. TRIBE, supra note 67, at 248-50.
135. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 3.
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ensure compliance through implementing legislation. Execution of the binational
panels' decisions is left to the administering authorities of each country, under
international law and the implementing legislation. Since the Canada-U.S.
binational panels perform a quasi-judicial function under international authority,
rather than an internal executive function, the reciprocal limitations imposed by
the FTA upon each country's executive power over these panels is not only
permissible under the U.S. Constitution but appropriate for the laudable purpose
of a free trade area with mutually fair rules between the two countries.
Just as the Supreme Court was unwilling to allow Congress to interfere
excessively with the President's authority to remove officers responsible for
carrying out exclusively executive functions in Bowsher, also it was unwilling to
permit the President to exercise unlimited discretion in removing officers charged
with judicial or legislative duties in Humphrey's Executor. We find no compa-
rable separation of powers problem in the process by which members of a
binational panel are appointed to make decisions under the FTA or removed from
the larger panel. No provision requires Congress to approve the appointment of
panelists from the United States or permits Congress to retain control over
persons named to the roster from which panelists are selected, except in
protected information received by panel members. The implementing legislation
at most requires consultation with Congress. 136 The effect of consultation might
limit the President's discretion in naming panelists by the practical suggestion
that certain experts, retired federal judges, for example, be considered (CIT
judges specifically). We find no impediment, however, to the voluntary service
of article III judges with international tribunals. Justice Jackson served as
prosecutor in the Nuremberg war crimes trials137 and Chief Justice Taft served as
sole arbitrator in the Tinoco arbitration between Costa Rica and Great Britain. 38
Both served in independent capacities not controlled by Congress or the
executive. Nor does the FTA or implementing legislation permit Congress to
exercise any control over United States panelists after they are appointed; all
panelists have a mandate under the FTA to act independently of their respective
governments. Moreover, since each panelist is permitted to participate in the
decision of just one case for each separate review.' 39 the FTA does not present
the same magnitude of concern about the integrity of the separation of legislative
136. Implementation Act, supra note 1. § 405(a)(3).
137. In regard to the presidential appointment of j'udges to sit on the International Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg. U.S. Attorney General Tom C. Clark suggested "'It]here is no express
prohibition against federal judges performing other services of a general nature for the Federal
Government. On the contrary. it is a well-established practice for the president to secure the services
of federal judges in connection with various matters." 40 Op. Ar'i GE.N. 423 (1945). Examples cited
included Chief Justice Jay's appointment as special envoy to England. and Circuit Judge Putnam's
appointment as a commissioner pursuant to a convention with Great Britain concerning the seizure
of vessels in the Bering Sea. Id.
138. 1 UN rm NATIONS RP' RTS OF INT'L AR11rrRAL AWARDS 375 (1923).
139. Free Trade Agreement. supra note 1. art. 1901.2(2).
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and executive powers that preoccupied the Court in Buckley and Bowsher. If a
particular panel member decides a case that offends the President, however, that
member might not be named to another panel and could be moved from the larger
roster.
D. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER JUDICIAL POWER
The Sentencing Reform Act,140 challenged on grounds of separation of
powers, provides yet another opportunity for analysis in encroachment by the
political branches into judicial powers. Even though upheld,' 4 1 we think this
challenge should be distinguished as well from binational panel review under the
FTA. Judges are appointed to the U.S. Sentencing Commission having both
legislative and judicial powers. The Commission consists of seven members,
three of whom must be federal judges, appointed by the President, confirmed by
the Senate, and subject to removal by the President for cause. The Commission
has established federal sentencing guidelines that bind federal judges in their
exercising sentencing discretion, even without congressional approval. This
delegation, while held unconstitutional by many federal district courts and
upheld by many, was upheld by the Supreme Court with only one dissent. 142 In
addition, the Commission allegedly exercises a quasi-legislative (or executive
according to Solicitor General Charles Fried in his oral argument), rather than
judicial function. Because the decisions of the binational panels will consist of
binding interpretations of existing law, rather than guidelines which must be
applied or interpreted by other tribunals, the function of the binational panels
must be characterized as essentially judicial, not legislative. More importantly,
though, the binational panel provisions do not raise the main concern expressed
by a lower court with respect to the Sentencing Act: that the delegation of an
essentially legislative duty to a commission avoids accountability on the part of
the legislature for the law generated by the Commission. The decisions of the
binational panels will be grounded entirely on law generated by the political
branches and international agreement, and have no formal status as precedent.
Accountability is both to the national constituencies through the executives of
each country and to the community of states under the law of treaties.
E. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAl. ENCROACHMENT ON THE EXECUTIVE:
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR STATUTE
One might argue that binational panels functioning independently of the
executive are equivalent to special prosecutors appointed under the Ethics in
140. Comprehensive Crime Control Act. Pub. L. No. 98-473, title 11, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986).
141. Mistretta v. United States. 57 U.S.L.W. 4102 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1989).
142. Id.
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Government Act. 14 3 That act created a "special division" of three Federal
appellate judges empowered to appoint special prosecutors responsible for the
prosecution of charges brought by the Attorney General against high-level
executive branch officials. The relevance of this argument became more serious
when the Act was struck down in January of 1988 by the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit' 44 on the grounds that special prosecutors are executive, or
"principal," not inferior officers. Pursuant to the Appointment clause, 45 special
prosecutors must therefore be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate and must be removable by the executive.
In Morrison v. Olson Solicitor General Fried argued to the Supreme Court that
the Ethics in Government Act "absolves Congress of its weightiest and most
painful duty, which is the scrutiny of the executive backed up by the painful duty
of impeachment." 146 In June 1988, the Supreme Court rejected Fried's argument
and reversed the Court of Appeals to uphold the act.' 47 Special prosecutors are
not principal officers, and they may be appointed and removed for cause under
the stringent conditions in the act effectively limiting the executive's plenary
removal power.
In contrast to the Sentencing and the Ethics in Government acts, the FTA and
its implementing statute require binational panel review of disputes arising
between beneficiaries of free trade and government agencies seeking to protect
national constituencies. Here both Congress and the President share with Canada
the highest political responsibility of constructing a free trade regime. Although
important, panels at most are inferior functional parts of this regime. Let us
consider these international functional tribunals more closely under separation of
powers principles.
F. APPOINTMENT AS QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICERS
SERVING INTERNATIONAL FUNCTIONS
International tribunals with narrow jurisdiction tied to a congressionally-
approved arrangement between the United States and another country pose no
threat to the separation of powers preserved by the Constitution. 48 The
Appointments clause logically applies only to domestic officers exercising
authority under one of the delegated powers. Even if this were not so . the
constitutionality of the delegation of authority to an international iufial is
clearly justified under the foreign relations and foreign commerce powers as a
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49. 591-8 (1982).
144. In re Sealed Case. 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
145. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
146. N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
147. Morrison v. Olson. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
148. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 4-5, 8-18.
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desirable part of an international regime in cooperation with another country. The
Appointments clause does not by itself require that binding interpretations of the
laws of the United States, which include international agreements, be carried out
exclusively by persons appointed in conformity with the Appointments clause.
Historically, from the Jay Treaty Commissions to the mixed claims tribunals of
this century and the U.S. Iranian Claims Tribunal, the appointment of interna-
tional judges or arbitrators has been controlled by international agreement. 149
With the exception of the appointments challenge by the Senate to the Permanent
Court of International Arbitration under the Hague agreements at the turn of the
century, no serious constitutional challenge to these tribunals has ever been
mounted. But then neither has such a tribunal been given binding power of
judicial review applying U.S. law in substitution of an existing article III court's
judicial reviews.
1. Policy Favoring Party Choice in
Binding International Commercial Arbitration
Our conclusion finds support in the policy favoring international commercial
arbitration agreements, exemplified most recently by the Supreme Court's
decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 151 In that
case the Court approved a national policy favoring party choice in international
commercial arbitration. In Mitsubishi a Japanese corporation had entered into a
distribution and sales agreement with a Puerto Rican corporation. The agreement
contained a clause providing for arbitration by the Japanese Commercial
Arbitration Association of disputes arising out of the agreement. Subsequently,
when Soler refused arbitration to resolve a dispute concerning the distribution of
automobiles to be shipped by Mitsubishi to Puerto Rico, Mitsubishi sought an
order to compel arbitration 152 in accordance with the sales agreement. Soler
counterclaimed, asserting causes of action under the Sherman Antitrust Act' 53
and other federal and Puerto Rican statutes. Relying on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
149. See id. at 7-1I.
150. In regard to presidential appointment of judges to the Permanent Court of International
Arbitration, which was created by ch. It of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes of 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. 392, U.S. Attorney General John Riggs suggested
that
members of the arbitration board . . . do not seem . . . to be officers of the United
States in the ordinary acceptation of the phrase. Nor are they . . . persons holding
office. . . . Their work is not only occasional, but contingent upon an appointment by
foreign powers to act as arbitrators in the settlement of disputes between the nations
so appointing them.
23 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 313, 315 (1900).
151. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
152. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 201 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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Co., 154 the district court held that the international commercial character of the
parties' agreement required enforcement of its arbitration provisions with respect
to the federal antitrust claims, 155 even though the court of appeals had previously
held that antitrust laws were " 'of a character inappropriate for enforcement by
arbitration' " in a domestic context. 156 Predictably, the court of appeals
reversed. 157
After granting review, the Supreme Court shifted its recognition of a policy of
reluctance to oust federal courts of jurisdiction over claims under federal statutes
and held that antitrust claims are indeed arbitrable pursuant to the arbitration
provisions of contracts in international commerce. As the Court stated:
[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transna-
tional tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for
predictability in the resolution of disputes require [the enforcement of] the parties'
agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context. 1-58
The review of final antidumping and countervailing duty orders by binational
panels under the FTA differs from the arbitration of federal claims in this case,
since the jurisdiction of a binational panel will not depend upon an international
commercial agreement between the private parties to a dispute. But it does
depend upon party choice of forum and process. An important policy underlies
each of these choices, as the Supreme Court observed with respect to interna-
tional arbitration agreements:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, not-
withstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must
be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce
in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts. 151
The public policy justification for a supranational forum for the resolution of
the legitimate anti-protectionist claims of producers and importers who ought to
enjoy the benefits and assume the risks of a free trade agreement is at least as
persuasive as the policy encouraging the enforcement of binding arbitration
clauses of disputes in international commercial contracts by rules of an
extra-national arbitration association. Because the free trade agreement affects
all commerce in goods between the signatories, individual importers and
154. 417 U.S. 506, 515-20 (1974). The Supreme Court ordered arbitration, pursuant to an
international agreement, of a claim arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite the
existence of precedent barring the arbitration of claims under the Securities Act of 1933 in a domestic
context.
155. 473 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1985).
156. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
157. Id.
158. Mitsubishi. 473 U.S. at 629 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
159. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614. 629 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 9 (1953)). But see Carbonneau. supra note 100.
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exporters need access to a tribunal capable of reviewing agency decisions to
assure fairness and nondiscrimination in the application of domestic law of
subsidies and dumping to all parties, pending the harmonization of domestic
laws, as is occurring in the European Common Market. The existence of such a
review tribunal promotes stability and predictability in international trade
between countries in the market, even if the tribunal's decisions are not binding
precedent, thus buttressing economic efficiency. The availability of a forum
where individual importers and exporters may seek review of the manner in
which the customs laws of either country are administered in subsidy and
dumping cases should speed the development of a stable free trade regime by
encouraging those persons most immediately affected to view the FTA as
equitable and responsive to their claims. The review process also seeks to ensure
compliance with the GATT exceptions for imposing duties in subsidy and
dumping cases where market forces are thwarted.
2. Inter-State Compact Analogy
Because the existing antidumping and countervailing duty laws of Canada and
the United States will be incorporated into the FA by article 1904(2), binational
panels established under the FTA will be responsible for the interpretation of the
international agreement itself, under international law. Any changes in domestic
law can be reviewed in a declaratory opinion procedure between governments to
minimize legislative changes that seek to reverse unpopular decisions. In view of
the Supreme Court's decision in Seattle Master Builders v. Pacific Northwest
Electric Power & Conservation Planning Council, 160 this incorporation by
reference allows the tribunal to remain functionally responsive to the interna-
tional agreement, not only domestic law. Seattle Master Builders upheld the
constitutionality of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation
Planning Council (Council), a policy-making body established with the approval
of Congress under the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conser-
vation Act. 161 The Council was charged with preparation of a conservation and
electricity usage plan for the region affected by the Bonneville Project Act. 16 2
Each of the states affected 163 in the case enacted legislation authorizing the
governor to appoint two members to the Council.' 64 Because the Council
exercised influence primarily over federal rather than state action, the petitioner
asserted first that it qualified as a federal agency, and second, that its members
were required to be appointed in accordance with article II, section 2 of the
Constitution.
160. 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986).
161. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(l) (1982).
162. 16 U.S.C, § 832a (1982).
163. Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho.
164. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43,-52A.010 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 469.800 (1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 90-4-401 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 61-1201 (1985).
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After determining that the Council qualified as part of an interstate compact
under express Constitutional authorization, rather than a federal agency, the
Supreme Court focused upon the Appointments clause. The Court held that,
because the Council members derived their authority from a compact that
required both state legislation and congressional approval, they did not in fact
perform their duties "pursuant to the laws of the United States."' 65 The Court
stated:
Without substantive state legislation, there would be no Council and Council members
to appoint. While congressional consent gives an interstate compact some attributes of
federal law, the Council members' appointment, salaries and administrative operations
are pursuant to the laws of the four individual states. . . . More important, the states
ultimately empower the council members to carry out their duties. 66
Despite the significant influence exercised by the Council over federal action, the
Appointments clause therefore did not operate to require Council members'
appointment by the President.
Two similarities between the interstate compact and the congressional-
executive agreement may be found. First, like a commission established pursuant
to a state compact, any authoritative body which is established pursuant to an
international agreement must exercise its authority with both the approval of the
Senate or Congress and in cooperation with countries under international law
through a functional organization such as an international commission. Although
its activities may affect actions of the federal government, an authoritative body
created by an international agreement derives authority from the agreement itself
as sanctioned under the law of nations. Senate or congressional approval may be
part of the constitutive and implementing process, but it is not the exclusive
source of the delegation. 167
Second, neither the state compact challenged in Seattle Master Builders nor
the FTA's provisions for the establishment of binational panels represents a threat
to the separation of powers protected by the Constitution. They are properly
viewed as questions of division of power between levels of government, not
horizontal checks on national powers meant to limit abuse. This division analysis
admittedly was one of the Court's reasons for upholding the state compact in
Seattle Master Builders. As the Court stated, "The appointments clause is
addressed to the separation of powers between the President and Congress. ...
No court has yet held that the appointments clause prohibits the creation of an
interstate planning council with members appointed by the states."1 68 Applica-
tion of the Appointments clause is similarly inappropriate in the case of members
165. Seattle Master Builders v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning Council, 786
F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986).
166. Id.
167. See HousE REPORT. supra note 101, at 14-15.
168. 786 F.2d at 1364-65.
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(who are not U.S. employees) appointed to the Canada-U.S. binational panels
from a roster of experts assembled under an international agreement.
VI. The Fate of Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims
The FTA text obligates the Parties merely to eliminate any possibility of
domestic judicial review of a final determination of a binational panel. The
United States implementing statute goes at least as far as this and denies power
and jurisdiction to all federal courts to review a final determination on any
question of law or fact by any kind of action, including mandamus.' 69 Nothing
in the language of the agreement, however, forecloses review by a United States
article III court of a constitutional claim not satisfactorily addressed by the
operation of the ETA, so long as no domestic judicial review of the determination
of fact or law under the ETA and statutes is available. United States implementing
legislation explicitly preserves constitutional review of the binational panel
system under the FTA by a named article 1II court with expedited procedures. 170
As we have analyzed the FTA, it seems highly unlikely that a constitutional
due process or other claim could ripen. The explicit provision for hearing any
such review, however, does invite any constitutional challenge, so we should
expect it. A binational panel might be seen to have "manifestly exceeded its
powers, authority or jurisdiction" pursuant to article 1904 of the FTA. If so, its
decision would be subject to the extraordinary challenge procedure by either
Party.' 7 1 The extraordinary challenge provision seems to contemplate the great
care the parties took to avoid constitutional cases or controversies that would
have to be raised in article Ill courts. The negotiators were surely aware that
precluding review of such questions, were they to arise, would unduly encroach
upon the judicial power over interpreting treaties, especially when constitutional
limitations must be decided by courts exercising such power. Those limitations
apply equally to any congressional act limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts,
including the broad exclusion from judicial power in the implementing legisla-
tion. The negotiators thus sought to craft process provisions of review to avoid
just such a contingency, but without an express exclusion of ultimate judicial
power in either country to review constitutional claims. 172
We make no attempt to analyze the Canadian constitutional questions
regarding the FTA, but we do note that in the implementing legislation, the
Congress conditions its approval on a finding by the executive that Canada under
its constitution has power to implement the FTA. Even answering the question of
169. Implementation Act, supra note I (Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986), amended by the addition of subsec. (g)(2)).
170. Id. amended by the addition of subsec. (g)(4). For summary of reasons, see HouSE REPORT,
supra note 101.
171. See Free Trade Agreement. supra note 1. art. 1904(13)(a)(iii)-(b). annex 1904.13.
172. For history. see Housr REPORT, supra note 101.
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power (currently involving the division of power between Parliament and the
Provinces) might not fully resolve the question whether Canadian courts might
retain jurisdiction over the possibility, however remote, of a violation of a
constitutional limitation to Canadian national power.
A. EXECUTIVE REFUSAL OF DUTY UNDER FTA AND STATUTE: CONTROL
OVER INITIATING BIPANEL REVIEW AND REMAND
Congressional-executive balances worked out in the implementing legislation
reflect tensions about who controls free trade or protectionist interests and policy.
Many complex issues do not reach constitutional proportions although they
present potential statutory conflict or conflict between statutes and the FTA.
Several potential problems, however, could raise constitutional issues that could
be adjudicated through the special judicial review procedures of the implement-
ing statute. These problems are essentially separation of powers questions but
begin with the relationship of international agreements to statutes. One involves
a variance between the FTA and the implementing legislation in requesting
binational panel review over final determinations in either country or in
requesting extraordinary panel review. The other involves the implementation of
the binding binational panel decisions by the executive branch.
1. Requesting Binational Panel Review under United States Law
Under the FTA, either Canada or the United States on its own initiative may
request binational panel review of a final determination, but must make such
request when a proper private person asks for it. 173 In contrast, under U.S.
implementing legislation the United States government may not request review
unless first initiated by a proper private person of the United States. 174 By the
specific language, Congress limited the exercise of discretion by the executive to
that of the mandatory international duty under the FTA triggered solely by a
private request by an appropriate party. No executive initiative is permitted by
statute, although available under the FTA. The limitation of executive discretion
by statute poses no constitutional problem. Under separation of powers princi-
ples, however, may Congress limit the executive choices solely to mandatory and
ministerial action required under the FTA when a proper private party requests
binational panel review? May an international agreement in effect create private
procedural rights bypassing executive discretion and control, or, in other words,
create a mandatory right of direct access to an international tribunal?
173. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1904(5).
174. The implementing legislation deems the filing of a request by such private party with the
Secretary of Commerce to be a request for establishment under the FTA. Implementation Act, supra
note I (Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended by the
addition of subsec. (g)(8)(C)).
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We may understand the question more clearly by testing it against each of two
different interpretations of the statute. First, if congressional approval of the FTA
places a mandatory international obligation upon the government to trigger
review when requested by a proper private party, then what remedy would the
private party have were the President for important policy reasons to order the
Secretary of Commerce not to make such request? Could the party seek
mandamus in a federal court in the face of the statutory limitation on federal
jurisdiction barring mandamus or other actions reviewing antidumping or
countervailing duty determinations of binational panel review? 175 Could the
private party go directly to the secretariat of the panel of experts in the name of
the Party, claiming a procedural right under international law of direct access to
binational panel review (akin to the ex rel. proceeding at common law)? Or does
the executive have a valid separation of powers claim against congressional
encroachment into the power of the executivd, including the decision whether to
breach an international agreement by barring private access, through the
implementing statute? Could a federal court enforce against the executive a
mandatory duty to trigger review on request, created by congressional-executive
international agreement? Would the congressional limitation to federal jurisdic-
tion of the courts in these cases deny a private party due process by removing any
judicial remedy for denying a procedural right created by international agreement
by the executive and Congress?
76
Second, if congressional approval of the FTA does not convert the interna-
tional obligation to trigger review on request into a statutory duty as well, what
internal effect does the mandatory international obligation have in the face of
congressional silence about such duty? Would a federal court, given the statutory
limitation on its jurisdiction, have power to order the Secretary of Commerce to
comply with the FTA's mandatory duty to trigger a review on request? Suppose
the Secretary has been ordered by the President for important policy reasons not
to comply with that duty. Can the federal courts under the supremacy clause
order compliance with the executive's own agreement or must the discretion to
breach an agreement constitutionally be preserved for executive decision under
the political question doctrine'? We think Judge Palmieri addressed this question
in deciding that Congress had not intended the Anti-terrorist Act to breach an
obligation under the Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations. He
refused to consider requiring the United States to arbitrate the Anti-terrorist Act
under provisions of the Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations before
reaching the merits of whether to enforce the Act. Judge Palmieri interpreted the
agreement between the United States and the United Nations as creating
international obligations regarding a third party, the Palestine Liberation Orga-
175. See Marhury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
176. For a review of possible due process questions, see supra notes 58-67 and accompanying
text. See also Goldwater v. Carter. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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nization (comparable to interested parties under the FTA). More significant to our
concern, the judge found constitutional limits to enforcing the obligation in the
separation of powers principle that gives the executive control over the question
whether to arbitrate or breach the agreement. This question seems the same, except
for its political significance, as the executive's control over the choice to request
binational review as required under the FTA or to breach the agreement. The same
choice arises in whether to implement a panel decision as mandated by
congressional-executive agreement. 177
We raise these questions not to impugn the good faith of the executive in
fulfilling international and statutory duty, for we doubt that any administration
would seriously consider consciously breaching an important agreement with
Canada reached after extensive policy discussions and negotiations. Rather, as in
other integrated markets such as the European Economic Community, we may
have future need for functional supranational tribunals capable of direct review
of decisions reducing or increasing barriers to trade when employment and
economic stability may be disrupted. Sooner or later, we shall have to work out
these institutional relationships and perhaps accept direct access by all affected
parties, despite policy disagreements, to functional international tribunals
charged with impartial review of trade law being harmonized between
countries. 178 We believe the modest bipanel review procedures even with
potential problems are creative innovations for the United States as well as
Canada and, despite skepticism from the City Bar of New York, 79 could well be
a model for other international economic institutions short of a common market.
2. Implementing Remand
The Implementation Act provides that decisions of binational panels to remand
a final determination shall be directed to the Department of Commerce or the
International Trade Commission. The statute also provides that the Court of
International Trade has no jurisdiction to review any such determination on
remand and that federal courts have no power by mandamus or otherwise to
review determinations of fact or law by the binational panel. Enforcement of the
binational panel decisions rests exclusively with executive agencies under the
statute. 18  The House Judiciary Committee concluded that implementation
177. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 690 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
178. One of the authors studied this question of procedures for direct access to international
tribunals surveying known experience to 1961 in a doctoral dissertation. Christenson, Individuals
Before International Tribunals: Direct Access in Private Matters (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, on
file Law Library. The George Washington University, 1961).
179. See Koh, supra note 1, at 248-49. There is some disagreement on this matter among
members of the international legal community. See Record, Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (Oct. 1988).
180. Implementation Act. supra note I (Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982
& Supp. IV 1986), amended by the addition of subsec. (g)(7)(A)).
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constitutionally does not require Presidential involvement. 18' If constitutional
challenge to direct remand succeeds, however, the Implementation Act autho-
rizes the President to accept the remand and presumably direct the remand to the
agencies. 182
While preserving exclusive executive power, does the congressional limitation
upon judicial power mean that the courts are completely barred from any
jurisdiction in aid of enforcement of an international and statutory obligation
should the President, for important policy reasons, order the agencies not to
implement a remand? Would the sole remedy for this failure of duty other than
theoretical impeachment be at the international level between governments for
breach of agreement? Would there be no judicial remedy available to private
parties in United States courts for failure of process created by congressional-
executive agreement under the supremacy clause and the take-care clause? A
serious constitutional problem is whether a congressional limitation on the
judicial power in these antidumping and countervailing duty cases bars judicial
review over the executive's failure to implement a decision of a binational panel,
as required under the congressional-executive agreement. Does such limitation
impermissibly encroach upon the judicial power under article III? Or does the
executive retain power under separation of powers principles to be free from
judicial review of a political decision to breach a clear mandatory duty? Here we
return full circle to our beginning questions about constitutional limits to
removing judicial review. Here, as before, we think the domestic distinction
applied in limiting judicial review of administrative decisions to facts and law
under the statute but not to other constitutional questions such as due process
should apply as well to attempts at limiting the judicial power under a
congressional-executive trade agreement despite a possible political question
objection. Article III court review for such questions, however remote they may
be, must always be available. We should not lightly presume that Congress
intended its limitations to jurisdiction to exclude such claims even when the
power of the political branches is at its greatest. Even if this narrow review
would fall outside the special constitutional review judicial procedures, the core
power to review a separation of powers question not otherwise contemplated
should be available in an article III court. The House Judiciary Committee report
never reached this question, expressing instead its confidence only that were a
fallback necessary as an unusual measure to involve the President, "all
binational panel or extraordinary challenge committee decisions will be fully
implemented, providing certainty to our Canadian partner."'1 83
181. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 17-18.
182. Implementation Act, supra note I (Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.
amended by the addition of subsec. (g)(7)(B)).
183. HousE REPORT, supra note 101, at 18.
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VII. Conclusion
The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement's provisions for the estab-
lishment of a binational panel with jurisdiction to review final antidumping and
countervailing duty orders are constitutionally sound for three reasons. First, the
authority of the President to enter into an international agreement that provides
for the establishment of a binational panel for the binding resolution of trade
disputes under the agreement is supported by legislative grants of authority to the
President, as well as by judicial precedent. Second, Congress may constitution-
ally limit the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade and Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, as article III courts, to hear appeals from final
antidumping and countervailing duty orders of administrative agencies under
U.S. statutes, since such appeals require the adjudication of only "public"
rights. These are generated by a federal statute and do not arise out of or replace
rights created by state or common law, although a long history gives some
credible argument that private expectations have traditionally found judicial
remedy for customs overcharges, beginning with common law actions of
assumpsit and trover. Third, Congress may agree to confer jurisdiction to review
final determinations in such "public rights" cases upon non-article III tribunals
such as the binational panels, provided that in doing so it does not abridge the
constitutional rights of litigants to due process of law or of any other fundamental
rights or constitutional questions. The provisions of the FTA seek to avoid any
questions of abuse or of denial of due process by providing individuals with the
right to appeal final orders to a binational panel charged with the duty of due
process, by extraordinary review procedures, by allowing all interested parties to
appear and be represented before the panels, and by requiring a panel to apply the
standard of review that is required of domestic courts, including constitutional
standards.
The FTA confers upon the binational panels the power to prevent constitu-
tional due process claims from arising but it does not create the exclusive
competence to adjudicate all issues, despite the FTA's provision and statute
precluding domestic law from providing domestic judicial review of a final
decision of a binational panel. A congressional-executive agreement may not bar
judicial review by article III courts of constitutional questions. Rather, the FTA
confines the jurisdiction of binational panels to a determination of whether or not
a final order is consistent with the antidumping and countervailing duty laws of
the country in which it was issued. The FTA's extraordinary challenge procedure
provides the parties with a means of challenging the fairness of process. The
availability of special constitutional review jurisdiction is preserved by the
implementing legislation.
Appointment of both Canadian and United States members to a binational
panel with authority to render binding decisions does not violate the appoint-
ments clause. In the past, the Supreme Court has invoked the appointments
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clause to invalidate acts of Congress only where Congress sought to confer upon
itself continuing control over an executive function. The process by which the
members of a binational panel are to be appointed under the FTA presents no
such threat to the separation of powers between the legislative and executive
branches of government, and would threaten the separation of powers between
the judicial and political branches only if federal judges were mandated for
appointment and they exercised a nonjudicial function.
A supranational tribunal with the authority to resolve specific trade disputes is
a functionally necessary part of a free trade area. Such a tribunal functions as an
institutionalized means of cooperation assuring the appearance and reality of
fairness to guard against protectionist biases in administrative decisions in either
country and furthers the profound advantage of an integrated North American
economy. While traditional analyses of the constitutionality of non-article III
tribunals in the domestic context might be used to clarify whether the Canada-
United States binational panels afford adequate protection to the rights of
affected private parties, they ought not seriously challenge the constitutionality
of the binational panels solely by virtue of their supranational character. An
article III court should always be available to review constitutional questions
should they arise after all procedures in the agreement have been exhausted,
including any denial of due process in the executive's duties to implement. We
doubt if a congressional-executive agreement as implemented by statute could
ever preclude such jurisdiction explicitly. We agree with the House Judiciary
Committee as far as it went on this subject. Understandably, however, it avoided
the question of judicial review over the breach of executive duty to implement a
panel decision. In effect, this question becomes the next interesting problem:
whether the President has the power, free from court review, to breach an
international and statutory duty prescribed clearly by the political branches at
their highest point in the exercise of shared power. In our view the judicial power
must be available at that point to preserve the rule of law.' 84
184. Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 909 (1974).
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